Ethereum Developers Postpone Glamsterdam Hard Fork on Hoodi Testnet Over Critical Gas Security Risks

Ethereum developers have officially decided to postpone the highly anticipated Glamsterdam hard fork on the Hoodi testnet following the identification of complex, gas-related security risks. These vulnerabilities could fundamentally alter how existing smart contracts handle failed transactions, posing a substantial threat to the overall security and reliability of decentralized applications running on the network.

The Ethereum Foundation (EF) announced that the upgrade, which was originally scheduled to take place on October 26, would be delayed indefinitely. This pause is designed to give core developers, researchers, and security auditors adequate time to investigate how several proposed changes interact with smart contracts already deployed in the wild on the Ethereum mainnet.

The security concerns first came to light on October 13, when prominent blockchain security firm ChainSecurity published a public warning detailing potential vulnerabilities associated with the upgrade. According to ChainSecurity’s analysis, two specific proposals included in the Glamsterdam upgrade package—designated as EIP-8037 and EIP-8038—could inadvertently weaken critical safeguards protecting the network against a sophisticated class of exploits known as insufficient gas griefing.

This unexpected postponement has inevitably introduced a significant degree of uncertainty over the broader timeline for rolling out the Glamsterdam hard fork on the Ethereum mainnet. Prior to the discovery of these gas-related vulnerabilities, Ethereum developers had been tentatively considering an early December launch window for the mainnet deployment. They had planned to finalize a concrete schedule only after observing the successful implementation and performance of the upgrade on the Hoodi testnet. However, with the testnet deployment now pushed back, the mainnet timeline is suspended until further notice as developers scramble to address the underlying code.

Gas Changes Could Undermine Existing Smart Contract Safeguards

In its technical analysis, ChainSecurity explained that under the new rules introduced by the upgrade, gas could potentially be refunded to a contract after an operation fails. Under current Ethereum rules, such a failure would typically halt execution immediately, but the proposed adjustments would allow the contract to continue running. The researchers cautioned that these mechanics could heavily interfere with existing security checks that rely on deterministic calculations regarding how much gas remains available during the lifecycle of a transaction.

The threat profile centers heavily on attacks known as insufficient gas griefing. In this type of malicious activity, an attacker or a malicious caller deliberately provides just enough—or rather, too little—gas for a legitimate smart contract operation to succeed, while still forcing the transaction to consume resources or alter state. ChainSecurity warned that Glamsterdam’s proposed modifications could undermine the established safeguards designed to thwart such attacks.

By altering how gas behaves upon failure, the upgrade could potentially allow contracts to permanently record failed operations as successful or alter internal states incorrectly. For example, an affected smart contract could inadvertently remove a user’s pending claim or prematurely disable the option to retry a failed operation altogether. This leaves the end user stranded, entirely unable to complete what would otherwise be a perfectly valid and expected transaction.

Despite the severity of the risks, ChainSecurity noted that the Glamsterdam upgrade would not render all gas-related security checks entirely unreliable. Certain traditional safeguards might still function as intended, but developers would nevertheless need to conduct comprehensive audits of their codebase to ensure their contracts properly account for the upgrade’s novel gas accounting rules.

The findings quickly prompted widespread concern among key contributors across the Ethereum ecosystem. In a public comment on GitHub on October 21, pseudonymous security researcher pcaversaccio described the identified risks as exceptionally serious, going so far as to call for an immediate and thorough reassessment of the hard fork’s parameters and readiness.

Adding to the urgency, ChainSecurity revealed late last week that its ongoing investigation had uncovered thirteen real-world examples of vulnerable smart contracts. The security firm stated that it was actively coordinating responsible disclosure efforts with the affected projects to help them mitigate the risk before any broader network implementation occurs. While ChainSecurity chose not to disclose specific technical details regarding these thirteen real-world examples, nor publicly identify the affected projects, the firm strongly urged all smart contract developers to audit their contracts as quickly as possible.

These fresh security discoveries arrive on the heels of an earlier warning issued by the Ethereum Foundation itself. The EF had previously cautioned that Glamsterdam’s revised gas model could inadvertently break a wide array of auxiliary ecosystem tools, including wallets, transaction indexers, and gas estimation utilities that rely on fixed historical assumptions about how Ethereum handles gas transactions.

The Glamsterdam upgrade had previously seen movement on other test networks, having been successfully activated on the Sepolia testnet on October 6. That deployment occurred just ahead of the planned Hoodi testnet rollout that has now been indefinitely delayed by the core development team. As developers return to the drawing board to address the gas-related security flaws, the Ethereum community awaits further guidance on when the upgrade path will safely resume.